Economist’s bleak picture on Turkey-EU

The Economist paints a very gloomy picture on the eve of Erdoğan’s visit to Brussels next week:

IN ANOTHER era, tanks might now be on the streets of Ankara and Istanbul. Over the past year Turkey has seen a crackdown on protests, corruption scandals, a purge of the police and judiciary, paranoid talk of foreign plots and fifth columns, an economic slowdown and more attempts to Islamicise society. Given this turmoil, Turkey’s soldiers would no doubt be tempted to sweep aside the failed politicians (as they have done four times in the past). That the generals have remained in barracks—or, in many cases, in jail—is a sign of democratic progress. But after years of strong growth and political reform, Turkey is sliding backwards, with more than a whiff of authoritarianism about the prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, whose Islamist-flavoured AK party has been in power since November 2002.

Mr Erdogan claims that a wave of arrests on December 17th, as part of an anti-corruption investigation that included the sons of three cabinet ministers, was a more grievous assault on democracy than any past coup. Indeed, he is making overtures to the same generals whom he put behind bars. His enemy now is his former ally, Fethullah Gulen, Turkey’s most influential cleric, who lives in self-imposed exile in Pennsylvania and whose devotees are thought to have infiltrated the police and judiciary. Hence Mr Erdogan’s reallocation of hundreds of policemen and prosecutors, and his legal grab for greater control over the judiciary.

Turkey’s European ambitions go back as far as 1959. Its membership talks have been slow, partly because of the dispute over Turkey’s 1974 occupation of northern Cyprus. The EU blocked eight of the 35 negotiating “chapters” because of Turkey’s refusal to open its ports and airports to (southern) Cyprus; Cyprus itself blocked another six; and France under President Nicolas Sarkozy blocked a further four. Military relations between the EU and NATO are also stuck (Turkey is a member, but Cyprus is not).

Until recently Mr Erdogan would boast that Europe needed Turkey, with its dynamic economy and geostrategic role, more than Turkey needed Europe. He pursued a policy of “zero problems” with his neighbours in the Middle East. When the Arab spring erupted in 2010 Turkey was held up as a model of moderate, democratic Islam. But the shine came off after his heavy-handed suppression of last June’s mass protests against plans to build over Gezi Park in Istanbul. His neo-Ottoman foreign policy fell apart when the Syrian civil war intensified and the Egyptian army unseated the country’s elected president, Muhammad Morsi, an Islamist ally. Turkey’s relations with America have been strained, not least because of a tentative decision to buy air-defence missiles from China and differences over Israel.

As Mr Erdogan’s problems have multiplied, his disdain for Europe has faded. It helps that France now has a less Turkophobic president in François Hollande. Last May Turkey signed a contract for a nuclear power station with a consortium including France’s Areva; Mr Hollande is due to visit Turkey later this month. So even though Mr Erdogan’s sultan-like tendencies have become clearer, Turkey’s accession efforts lurched forward last autumn. In October the EU opened a new chapter, dealing with regional policy. In December Turkey agreed to start taking back illegal migrants crossing into the EU, against a commitment to negotiate a visa-liberalisation deal for visiting Turks. For Ian Lesser of the German Marshall Fund, a transatlantic think-tank, Turkey now needs a “zero problems” strategy with the West. But the latest upheaval makes that harder. Turkey’s friends struggle to defend Mr Erdogan. And the Tory-led government in Britain, once Turkey’s biggest champion, has become sceptical of EU enlargement and the free movement of workers.

Too big to swallow

The accession of Turkey touches one of the club’s great unanswered questions: where are the borders of Europe? It is easy to say that the small countries of the western Balkans should one day join. But Turkey, like Ukraine, may be too big to let in.

To Brussels insiders, the lack of a clear membership path has weakened the EU’s ability to influence Turkey. But it is a stretch to claim, as some do, that Europe has “lost” Turkey as a result. Europe cannot settle a dogfight between a shadowy brotherhood that has infiltrated organs of state and an increasingly intolerant prime minister who thinks he embodies the state.

Perhaps the EU could help by opening chapter 23, on the judiciary and fundamental rights, and chapter 24, on justice, freedom and security. This would not be to reward Mr Erdogan, but to increase the pressure on him. Yet that would require the obdurate Greek-Cypriots to come to their senses. If even they cannot see that their own best interest lies in a more democratic and European Turkey, why should Mr Erdogan be any different?


About yavuzbaydar

Yavuz Baydar has been an award-winning Turkish journalist, whose professional activity spans nearly four decades. In December 2013, Baydar co-founded the independent media platform, P24, Punto24, to monitor the media sector of Turkey, as well as organizing surveys, and training workshops. Baydar wrote opinion columns, in Turkish, liberal daily Ozgur Dusunce and news site Haberdar, and in English, daily Today's Zaman, on domestic and foreign policy issues related to Turkey, and media matters, until all had to cease publications due to growing political oppression. Currently, he writes regular chronicles for Die Süddeutsche Zeitung, and opinion columns for the Arab Weekly, as well as analysis for Index on Censorship. Baydar blogs with the Huffington Post, sharing his his analysis and views on Turkish politics, the Middle East, Balkans, Europe, U.S-Turkish relations, human rights, free speech, press freedom, history, etc. His opinion articles appeared at the New York Times, the Guardian, El Pais, Svenska Dagbladet, and Al Jazeera English online. Turkey’s first news ombudsman, beginning at Milliyet daily in 1999, Baydar worked in the same role as reader representative until 2014. His work included reader complaints with content, and commentary on media ethics. Working in a tough professional climate had its costs: he was twice forced to leave his job, after his self-critical columns on journalistic flaws and fabricated news stories. Baydar worked as producer and news presenter in Swedish Radio &TV Corp. (SR) Stockholm, Sweden between 1979-1991; as correspondent for Scandinavia and Baltics for Turkish daily Cumhuriyet between 1980-1992, and the BBC World Service, in early 1990's. Returning to Turkey in 1994, he worked as reporter and ediytor for various outlets in print, as well as hosting debate porogrammes in public and private TV channels. Baydar studied informatics, cybernetics and, later, had his journalism ediucatiob in the University of Stockholm. Baydar served as president of the U.S. based International Organizaton of News Ombudsmen (ONO) in 2003. He was a Knight-Wallace Fellow at University of Michigan in 2004. Baydar was given the Special Award of the European Press Prize (EPP), for 'excellence in journalism', along with the Guardian and Der Spiegel in 2014. He won the Umbria Journalism Award in March 2014 and Caravella/Mare Nostrum Prize in 2015; both in Italy. Baydar completed an extensive research on self-censorship, corruption in media, and growing threats over journalism in Turkey as a Shorenstein Fellow at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard.
This entry was posted in Turkey. Bookmark the permalink.

Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in: Logo

You are commenting using your account. Log Out /  Change )

Google+ photo

You are commenting using your Google+ account. Log Out /  Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out /  Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out /  Change )


Connecting to %s