Turkey faces isolation in Mosul

The more Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan drives his policy on having a say over Syria’s future and insists on expand­ing influence along his country’s southern border, the more resentment from the neighbour­hood he faces.

On the eve of the Mosul of­fensive, Erdogan was once more vocal, declaring his opposition to foreign intervention to the Islamic State-controlled city. “Mosul be­longs to those who live in Mosul and nobody has a right to enter here,” he said. “When the city is liberated from [the Islamic State (ISIS)], only Sunni Arabs, Turkmen and Sunni Kurds should live there.”

putin-erdogan-obama

While the emphasis on Sunni identity is sufficiently underlined, the question remains whether such calls echo positively in Iraq or Syria.

The latter, backed by Russia, has made it clear that, no matter how deeply into the Syrian soil Turkish armed forces may have advanced, the issue of establishing a safe zone will not be that easy. Both Moscow and Damascus know that as long as Ankara’s Kurdophobia is at play and its rift with the US administration continues, the Turkish military presence aimed at blocking Kurdish People’s Protec­tion Units (YPG) advances is a frag­ile one, to be tolerated as long as it is useful for Assad-regime forces to weaken the Syrian opposition.

Americans, meanwhile, try to pursue their own agenda. A Raqqa offensive is in the making, along with the one against Mosul, and there are two lines of argument against each other in Washing­ton that have to do with the role of Turkey. One side, the sources say, thinks that the YPG should continue to be relied on for deci­sive combat. The other side says a NATO military force such as Turkey should be engaged more, with the condition of excluding the Kurdish element in the battle, which is to be extended into Iraqi territory.

Voices in support of giving Turkey a lead combat role in the anti-ISIS offensive have come also from elsewhere. ”Only Turkey is in a political and military position to intervene on the ground over Aleppo and it is demonstrating this at present by attacking ISIS. Turkey can now, because of changed circumstances, create a crucial balancing factor in Syria by taking urgent humanitarian action with its troops and air power in relieving the siege of Aleppo,” wrote David Owen, a former British Foreign secretary, in the Guardian.

”Turkish military action should and could be mounted within hours of a decision by Erdogan. It would have the power to imple­ment a no-fly zone (NFZ), with pro­tected land corridors for humani­tarian aid and the flow of people both ways into and out of Aleppo,” he wrote.

“This should be accompanied by a demand for the withdrawal of Assad forces to a line between Hama and Aleppo… [NATO] forces would guard Turkey from the air as it conducted this humanitarian operation. Air activity outside the NFZ would continue against [ISIS] in Syria and Iraq by Russia, [NATO] and Assad forces.

“A Kurdish area of influence in Syria in relation to [ISIS] would continue de facto but there would be no de jure implications, for that would be both unacceptable to Turkey and pre-empt a much more difficult medium-term settlement of issues that involve Iraq and Iran.’

Emboldened by the growing pro-Turkish stand, Erdogan sees a prospect of power sharing in the re­gional chess game, which he thinks will cement his leadership at home.

The reality on the ground speaks differently. No matter what, Tur­key is seen as an invading force both in Syria and Iraq because of its military presence in both coun­tries’ northern territories. This causes deep suspicion about its intentions within the Russia-Syria axis, as well as within the interna­tional coalition.

Soon after the Turkish parlia­ment passed a resolution renew­ing the government mandate for continued cross-border military action, a fierce reaction from the Iraqi parliament added to the ten­sion. Its statement declaring that Turkey will be seen as occupa­tional force threatens that bilateral treaties with Ankara be suspended and condemns Erdogan’s recent statements.

Once more, Erdogan stands between his unwaning intention to assert his will over two south­ern neighbours, with Ottomanism lurking in the background, and the reality. He has been pushing Iraqi Kurdistan President Masoud Barzani to take Ankara’s side but, as Baghdad reads this move, it complicates the fragile ground as the Mosul offensive approaches. Stakes for the Turkish government are higher than ever before, regard­less of full military engagement or not.

Reklamlar

About yavuzbaydar

Yavuz Baydar has been an award-winning Turkish journalist, whose professional activity spans nearly four decades. In December 2013, Baydar co-founded the independent media platform, P24, Punto24, to monitor the media sector of Turkey, as well as organizing surveys, and training workshops. Baydar wrote opinion columns, in Turkish, liberal daily Ozgur Dusunce and news site Haberdar, and in English, daily Today's Zaman, on domestic and foreign policy issues related to Turkey, and media matters, until all had to cease publications due to growing political oppression. Currently, he writes regular chronicles for Die Süddeutsche Zeitung, and opinion columns for the Arab Weekly, as well as analysis for Index on Censorship. Baydar blogs with the Huffington Post, sharing his his analysis and views on Turkish politics, the Middle East, Balkans, Europe, U.S-Turkish relations, human rights, free speech, press freedom, history, etc. His opinion articles appeared at the New York Times, the Guardian, El Pais, Svenska Dagbladet, and Al Jazeera English online. Turkey’s first news ombudsman, beginning at Milliyet daily in 1999, Baydar worked in the same role as reader representative until 2014. His work included reader complaints with content, and commentary on media ethics. Working in a tough professional climate had its costs: he was twice forced to leave his job, after his self-critical columns on journalistic flaws and fabricated news stories. Baydar worked as producer and news presenter in Swedish Radio &TV Corp. (SR) Stockholm, Sweden between 1979-1991; as correspondent for Scandinavia and Baltics for Turkish daily Cumhuriyet between 1980-1992, and the BBC World Service, in early 1990's. Returning to Turkey in 1994, he worked as reporter and ediytor for various outlets in print, as well as hosting debate porogrammes in public and private TV channels. Baydar studied informatics, cybernetics and, later, had his journalism ediucatiob in the University of Stockholm. Baydar served as president of the U.S. based International Organizaton of News Ombudsmen (ONO) in 2003. He was a Knight-Wallace Fellow at University of Michigan in 2004. Baydar was given the Special Award of the European Press Prize (EPP), for 'excellence in journalism', along with the Guardian and Der Spiegel in 2014. He won the Umbria Journalism Award in March 2014 and Caravella/Mare Nostrum Prize in 2015; both in Italy. Baydar completed an extensive research on self-censorship, corruption in media, and growing threats over journalism in Turkey as a Shorenstein Fellow at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard.
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