‘Qatar effect’ on Turkey seems inevitable: ‘Twin brothers in arms’ are in trouble

Soon after the Qatar crisis erupted, worries started mounting in Ankara. Given the message sent by Gulf Arab countries leading efforts to isolate Qatar, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) were concerned that Turkey would be the next target.

What was behind such a percep­tion? Fundamentally, it is ideologi­cal closeness. ”In recent years, the two countries have developed an ideological affinity that has, in turn, spurred military and commercial ties between Ankara and Doha,” Middle East analyst Steven Cook at the Council on Foreign Relations wrote for Salon.

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At first sight, pundits were busy examining three areas: Turkey’s na­tional political interests, economic relations and ideological dimen­sions.

There is not much to consider about the first. There is a widely shared consensus among interna­tional experts as well as well-in­formed domestic opposition circles that Turkey’s foreign policy contin­ues to follow its course on a down­ward spiral because of Ankara’s per­sistent erratic decisions. Turkey’s once-famous “zero problems with neighbourhoods” foreign policy doctrine has long been buried. On the contrary, Turkey under the AKP faces even deeper conflict with its entire neighbourhood.

Qatar is likely to be the exception. Turkey and Qa­tar’s good relations rest on two foundations: Military cooperation and financial investment.

On the first dimension, two accords were fast-tracked through parlia­ment. As pointed out by Turkish reporter Fehim Tastekin, the first accord, which will be valid for ten years and can be extended for 5-year periods, out­lines a Qatar-Turkey Tacti­cal Division Headquarters to be commanded by a Qatari major-general, assisted by a Turkish brigadier-general. Some 500-600 soldiers will be based at the headquarters. There are now 95 Turkish troops in Qatar. An explosives demolition team with 25-30 members will also be going. The second accord will enable Turkey to train about 4,000 Qatari gendarmerie personnel.

The military cooperation ap­pears not to be crucial to Qatar’s present foes, the United States or Iran. Observers shrug, hinting that it will add to Turkey’s troubles rath­er than have a role of deterrence.

Many argued that Turkey’s na­tional interests have been redefined and replaced by personal (Erdogan and his close circle) and institu­tional (the AKP and its emerging oligarchic structures) interests.

It is clear Erdogan has tied much of his hope for political survival to Qatari capital. Qatar is Turkey’s seventh biggest direct investor, Deutsche Welle said.

The amount of trade — $710 mil­lion — is not impressive but Qatar is the second largest investor after Russia in Turkey’s newly estab­lished sovereign wealth fund, which has assets worth $40 billion.

Erdogan is doing his best to gain as big a stake in Qatar’s investment portfolios, which amount to more than $335 billion worldwide, as possible. Qatar owns 49% of BMC, a Turkish military vehicle producer. It has two Turkish banks, one of which ranks as eighth biggest in Turkey. More than one-third of the foreign currency inflow to Tur­key over the past year ($11 billion) originated in Qatar. For Turkish construction firms, Qatar is an oasis: They have so far taken over projects valued at nearly $14 billion.

So, the economic dimension is not insignificant but it is certainly not what is driving the AKP’s paranoia.

Erdogan and his team read the crisis as an attempt to redefine alliances and what they see as murky scenar­ios. The looming threat to Ankara, therefore, is that its dual alliance forged by an ideology, based on relations with the Muslim Brother­hood and staunch logistical support for jihadist groups in Libya and in Syria, will be targeted. Such is Erdogan’s reading of the two items in the Riyadh declaration, which talks about a) solidarity, b) a military alliance against terrorism — a Sunni Islam Front against the so-called Shia Belt.

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It is a kerfuffle, no doubt. Among the known knowns though, is the fact that, after the eruption of the Arab uprising, Erdogan and the AKP saw an opportunity to emerge as a leading force in uniting and steer­ing the Islamic world. It did this by endorsing Muslim Brotherhood movements across the region and beyond — all the way to Myanmar.

Merged with a neo-Ottoman dream, driven by Turkey’s urge for regime change in Syria, this discreet pro-jihadist stance continued, many pundits argue, until it faded after Russia’s intervention in the Syr­ian conflict. By that time, Ankara’s active interventionism had become visible to the whole world.

Therefore, argues Bereket Kar, an expert on Turkey-Middle East relations in Turkey, a breakdown of the dual alliance would cause huge losses for Ankara.

“Because,” he said in an interview with the news site Duvar, the “two countries have acted like twins while the AKP is in power. Qatar was acting like a bank for the forces that made the backbone of jihadists. This meant not only support for those but also those placed in Turkey.

“It seems unlikely that Turkey will let Qatar down but, if it stands against Saudi Arabia, it will then face the entire Gulf as a foe. It will mean a collapse of their invest­ments. So Turkey cannot afford to choose a side. We have a hugely pro­found problem here and Turkey has neither a perspective nor a regime character to act as an intermediary,” he said.

In the broader context, beyond the combat against jihadism, the Qatari crisis will inevitably target whatever is left politically of the Muslim Brotherhood across the region, with far-reaching conse­quences. Erdogan knows that if the AKP is perceived as part of the Mus­lim Brotherhood, it is the only one holding power, thus the paranoia and panic.

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About yavuzbaydar

Yavuz Baydar has been an award-winning Turkish journalist, whose professional activity spans nearly four decades. In December 2013, Baydar co-founded the independent media platform, P24, Punto24, to monitor the media sector of Turkey, as well as organizing surveys, and training workshops. Baydar wrote opinion columns, in Turkish, liberal daily Ozgur Dusunce and news site Haberdar, and in English, daily Today's Zaman, on domestic and foreign policy issues related to Turkey, and media matters, until all had to cease publications due to growing political oppression. Currently, he writes regular chronicles for Die Süddeutsche Zeitung, and opinion columns for the Arab Weekly, as well as analysis for Index on Censorship. Baydar blogs with the Huffington Post, sharing his his analysis and views on Turkish politics, the Middle East, Balkans, Europe, U.S-Turkish relations, human rights, free speech, press freedom, history, etc. His opinion articles appeared at the New York Times, the Guardian, El Pais, Svenska Dagbladet, and Al Jazeera English online. Turkey’s first news ombudsman, beginning at Milliyet daily in 1999, Baydar worked in the same role as reader representative until 2014. His work included reader complaints with content, and commentary on media ethics. Working in a tough professional climate had its costs: he was twice forced to leave his job, after his self-critical columns on journalistic flaws and fabricated news stories. Baydar worked as producer and news presenter in Swedish Radio &TV Corp. (SR) Stockholm, Sweden between 1979-1991; as correspondent for Scandinavia and Baltics for Turkish daily Cumhuriyet between 1980-1992, and the BBC World Service, in early 1990's. Returning to Turkey in 1994, he worked as reporter and ediytor for various outlets in print, as well as hosting debate porogrammes in public and private TV channels. Baydar studied informatics, cybernetics and, later, had his journalism ediucatiob in the University of Stockholm. Baydar served as president of the U.S. based International Organizaton of News Ombudsmen (ONO) in 2003. He was a Knight-Wallace Fellow at University of Michigan in 2004. Baydar was given the Special Award of the European Press Prize (EPP), for 'excellence in journalism', along with the Guardian and Der Spiegel in 2014. He won the Umbria Journalism Award in March 2014 and Caravella/Mare Nostrum Prize in 2015; both in Italy. Baydar completed an extensive research on self-censorship, corruption in media, and growing threats over journalism in Turkey as a Shorenstein Fellow at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard.
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